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ABSTRACT
A Comparative Perspective between FARC Guerrilleras and Chechen Black Widows
by
Denise Rivera

Advisor: Professor Peter Liberman
This paper will explore the similar and different characteristics between Colombian
female combatants who are members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and the Chechen female suicide bombers who
joined the Chechen insurgency movement. It shall provide a brief historical background of how
the FARC, a leftist guerrilla group, and the Chechen insurgency movement ascended into
prominence during civil conflicts in Colombia and Chechnya respectively. It will discuss how
many women in both countries would pursue a different form of activism and defy patriarchal
norms by engaging in acts of violence in the name of their insurgent groups as a way to improve
the political situation and establish social justice within their states.
This paper will investigate the similarities and differences regarding the FARC guerrilla
group recruitment of female combatants and the Chechen insurgent group recruitment of female
suicide bombers. It will also analyze the motivations that prompted Colombian women to join
FARC and Chechen women to become suicide bombers. The main argument that I seek to
present and prove throughout my thesis is that despite having proved themselves as influential
participants within non-state actors, later on classified as terrorist groups, both FARC female
fighters and Black Widows remain as invisible perpetrators. Therefore, both FARC and the
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Chechen insurgent groups have failed to accomplish and set egalitarian standards to improve the
status of women within the societies of Colombia and Chechnya.
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Introduction
One of the most perplexing instances that have challenged the status quo within civil
conflicts is the presence of female fighters carrying out violent actions on behalf of insurgencies.
Insurgencies are also known as non-state actors, entities that seek to challenge and overthrow
oppressive state actors. The insurgent groups that will be presented in this thesis are the Chechen
nationalist movement and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. Section 1 will
investigate the emergence of the insurgency within Colombia and Chechnya. It will first focus on
the origins of the FARC and then it will transition to the origins of the Chechen separatist
movement. Its purpose is to reveal the popularity of these non-state actors in gaining many
female supporters. It also criticizes the lack of interest of Russian and Colombian state actors in
halting their own actions that cause deleterious consequences on the Chechen and Colombian
population. Moreover, it shall also highlight the similarities and differences that both
insurgencies exhibit involving the inadequacy of state actors in mitigating gender roles for
females.
The specific factions in this paper are the Black Widows in Chechnya and the FARC
guerrilleras (female guerrillas) in Colombia. Section 2 will examine the benefits of recruiting
women within the insurgent movements of Colombia and Chechnya. In addition, it will explore
the main motivations that caused women to participate in these insurgent movements. First, it
will first address the FARC insurgency motives for having female guerrilleras as part of their
agenda and the beneficial outcomes they hoped it would bring to the FARC in aims to gain a
positive image within Colombia. It will then discuss the perspectives of Colombian guerrilleras
as to what reasons compelled them to join FARC. Thereafter, this paper will switch its attention
to the Chechen insurgency during the Second Chechen War and the reasons insurgents went out
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of their way to recruit women to become suicide bombers in attempts to gain national liberation
for Chechnya from the grip of Russia. It will examine the perspectives of Chechen women as to
why they decided to commit themselves to suicide bombing missions. The purpose of this
section is to show how engrossed both insurgent movements were in accomplishing the rise of
their own domestic agendas yet failed to accommodate for the rise of their female members.
The reason for selecting the Black Widows and FARC guerrilleras is to point out the striking
similarities between them as female insurgents. The main argument of this paper is that despite
the fact that both insurgencies in Chechnya and Colombia sought to achieve national reform,
their female members did not get to experience such reforms in regards to gender roles. The
purpose of this comparative analysis is to point out the insurgent movements flaws in the sense
that they treated women’s rights as inconsequential, verifying that females mostly remain
invisible to both state and non-state actors within Chechnya and Colombia.
I.

Emergence of Colombian and Chechen insurgency

a. The Nascent of Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
The origins of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia stemmed from the lack of
recognition by representatives of Colombia’s government and their failure to meet the demands
of their constituencies. Colombia was going through a tumultuous civil conflict known as La
Violencia (1948 – 1958), where both the Liberal and Conservative political parties were vying
for majority control of the Colombian government.1 This issue would finally be resolved in 1958
when both parties created an agreement to share power, but did not consider sharing that political
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power with left-wing communist groups.2 These two political parties failed to include a minority
political faction in having a role to represent other constituencies within Colombian state affairs.
The opportunity of becoming an effective state actor was never provided to the communist
groups. This would set off the perfect environment for an insurgent movement to emerge. Two
prominent leaders named Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas would help in organizing and
leading the new guerrilla branch called the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.3
Most of the FARC leaders came from a peasant class background, proclaiming their stance
against state repression and promoting communism within rural areas of Colombia.4 Forming a
non-state actor group provided a good chance for Colombians of the peasantry class to determine
the best domestic policies for their country.
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia were able to gain a strong hold within
the country due to the terrible social circumstances that many Colombians endured. The ruling
elites failed to enact measures to remediate the political, social, and economic structures that
marginalized Colombians of lower socioeconomic status.5 After La Violencia period, the
Colombian government would collaborate with corporations who were granted land rights
throughout the 1970s – this would cause many peasants to lose their livelihood and become
displaced.6 Being ignored by the Colombian government and other politicians would serve
beneficial to the insurgent uprising. Many displaced Colombians would seek sanctuary in jungle
areas, where FARC began to set up its support base and promote itself as an alternative for
2
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Colombians to endorse.7 Colombia has been plagued with violence, instability, and conflict.8
Colombian society and economy suffer because of this, thus prompting many to seek other
measures of protection considered safe.9 Whereas Colombian state actors were enforcers of
Colombia’s troubles, FARC insurgency presented itself as the solution to solve them.
The objectives of the FARC were to reach out to the majority of Colombia’s oppressed and
poor population in order to represent their interests and gain support. FARC did this by creating
goals such as implementing political reform, eradicating government corruption, expanding rural
social programs, and limiting Colombia’s military and defense budget.10 FARC also sought to
implement equal agricultural reform for individuals and proper local autonomy.11 The message
that FARC promoted gave a clear understanding about the plight of the majority of Colombians
that do not support either the Conservative or Liberal political parties. It has also been observed
that FARC displayed a reactionary platform due to Colombia’s domestic environment constantly
riddled with political violence and militant aggression.12 By basing themselves in rural, remote
regions where government services are not available to those in need, FARC has taken a
prominent role in being the primary fountain for providing social services, conflict mediation,
and public order.13 The overall positive message that FARC advocates is very alluring for any
oppressed population and vital for its existence to carry out guerrilla activities.
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The impact that FARC’s guerrilla activities has within Colombia’s domestic sphere
demonstrates how it gained recognition as a formidable insurgent group. Since 1964, FARC has
been considered one of the longest enduring guerrilla movements in the world.14 It is also
considered to have one of the largest and best-equipped guerrilla forces.15 FARC has engaged in
guerrilla warfare through territorial conquests, kidnapping politicians and important individuals,
and direct combat with government troops.16 This illustrates how committed FARC guerrillas are
willing to engage in violence for the sake of raising awareness of the incompetence of
Colombian state actors. Although it has been argued that the promotion of platforms to end
social inequalities should be done through peaceful measures, it does not seem to be the best
route for FARC’s activities due the surmountable amount of repression enforced by Colombia’s
government. FARC advises its supporters to boycott elections and attack polling stations in order
to prevent incompetent politicians from being elected.17 It also has been observed that FARC’s
guerrilla tactics involve the usage of explosive techniques similar to the ones deployed by
terrorists in Northern Ireland and Spain.18 FARC has been designated a controversial non-state
actor due to the deriving income it receives from drug trades and kidnapping ransoms.19 As a
result, FARC has been deemed notorious and detrimental to Colombia’s domestic security and
even considered a threat to international security.
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The international and domestic reactions towards FARC and its activities are very
paradoxical. The United States and the European Union have deemed this non-state actor as a
terrorist organization.20 The United States has been heavily involved in providing financial and
military assistance to the Colombian government to enact counterterrorist measures.21 Most
Western governments flatly reject and dismiss FARC as a dangerous group to the public, yet
haven’t really navigated or explored its origins or the criticism that FARC makes towards
Colombia’s government.22 This is an understandable perspective considering the tumultuous
outcomes that have resulted from the clashes between Colombian government troops and FARC
guerrillas. Due to the conflict between non-state actor groups with Colombia’s state actors,
Colombia has succumbed into a civil war that has resulted in a catastrophic death count of
35,000 people within the last ten years.23 However, this does not give outside state actors the
leeway to presume that quashing guerrilla forces will establish peace within Colombia. Instead,
outside state actors should review their comprehension of what brings guerrilla movements into
fruition and what kind of social issues they seek to rectify.
Despite the lack of international recognition and condemnation from Colombia’s
government, FARC has been able to recruit many civilians in fighting for their cause. Although
FARC has shown no intentions of becoming a political party through electing officials, their
impact can been seen through their community-level activities towards people who have no
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access to government-run resources.24 This can be exemplified by FARC’s notorious relationship
with the narcotics trade, in which they are able to provide employment for farmers and laborers
by cultivating sustainable cocoa crops on farms owned by drug traffickers.25 Although it may
appear criminal that FARC is involved in these illicit activities, it assists with the displaced
farmers in need of gaining higher wages to provide for their families – this is especially
significant since working on corporate-owned farms would produce a low wage and no job
security.26 By taking a stance against the status quo of Colombia’s negligent policies, FARC also
challenged the restriction on women’s activities and assigned gender roles by including them in
guerrilla warfare and terrorist activities.27 This demonstrates that Colombia’s state actors failed
to recognize and consider the social inequalities that Colombian women have experienced.
Through enlisting themselves with FARC, Colombian women hoped to have their demands
recognized by a non-state actor instead.
b. The Nascent of Chechnya’s Insurgency
The origins of the Chechen population’s petition for self-determination can be traced back to
the brutal regime of Stalin. The Chechens were among the many ethnic groups under Soviet rule
that were accused of working with Germany from 1943 – 1944.28 As a result, they lived in exile
in Central Asia.29 From the 618,000 that were deported, a third of the population died.30 This
portrayed the failure of the Soviet government in protecting and supporting the interests of this
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non-Russian population. This would also mark the beginning of Chechens’ animosity towards
Soviet rule. Eventually, Stalin would create multiethnic republics in order to prevent these ethnic
groups from uniting to challenge Soviet rule.31 The region of Chechnya is located 1,000 miles
south of Moscow between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.32 Although Chechnya didn’t
produce an uprising, it would remain preoccupied by old grievances and national
consciousness.33 Like other republics within Eastern European regions under Soviet rule,
Chechnya sought to declare independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.34 The
end of Soviet rule permitted some republics the opportunity to pursue their nationalist endeavors
in forming self-sufficient governments no longer dependent on Russian control. It was the
perfect environment for Chechens to disengage themselves from the inadequacies of Russian
state actors.
Alongside this demand for self-sovereignty, Chechnya was plagued with domestic problems
of their own. Chechnya was dealing with high unemployment rates, poverty, government failure,
and lack of guidance by pro-Russian political leaders who did not provide a resolution in
creating an alternative that would permit Chechnya to have a self-sufficient government.35 Once
again, Chechens were suffering under other state actors that were not resolving their issues. A
former Soviet military officer named Dzhokar Dudayev would lead a nationalist movement
coming into fruition.36 Dudayev would eventually become President of Chechnya and

31

Ibid.
Francine Banner, “Uncivil wars: ‘Suicide bomber identity’ as a product of Russo-Chechen conflict.” Religion, State
& Society 34, no.3 (2006): 219.
33
Rajan Menon and Graham E. Fuller, “Russia’s Ruinous Chechen War.” Foreign Affairs 79, no.2 (2000): 34.
34
Francine Banner, “Uncivil wars: ‘Suicide bomber identity’ as a product of Russo-Chechen conflict.” Religion, State
& Society 34, no.3 (2006): 222.
35
Ibid, 222 – 223.
36
Ibid, 232.
32

8

encouraged the formation of a separatist government from Russia.37 Russia’s former Prime
Minister Boris Yeltsin approved to dispatch a coup d’état in August 1991 to remove Dudayev
from power and reassert Russian control, but it failed. This would prompt Chechnya’s immediate
approval of a de facto secession from the former Soviet Union.38 This would further test
Chechnya’s separatist commitments as a conflict would inevitably erupt between Russia and
Chechnya.
The clash between Russia and Chechnya based on different stances towards Chechen
independence would lead to the first Russo-Chechen War. Chechnya would remain under a de
facto independence until December 1994, when the Russian Army launched a massive attack in
Grozny, the Chechen capital, in attempts to regain Chechen control.39 Galina Stavoitova,
Yeltsin’s adviser, described the following reasons for the former prime minister’s willingness to
fight Chechnya: distract the Russian population from economic reforms with a victorious war,
provide its troops a chance to redeem themselves after suffering huge losses in Afghanistan, and
protect economic interests involving the pipeline route that was under Chechen territory.40
Furthermore, Grozny was an ideal place for smuggling massive amounts of Russian weapons,
oil, drugs, and money laundering for Russian officials and politicians.41 Many economic interests
from Russia were being threatened, further proving to Russia that the Chechen nationalist
movement had to be defeated. This would only provoke the Chechens to unite in fighting against
the Russian intervention. The first war would end in August 1996 with both Chechens and
37
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Russians agreeing to sign the Khasavyurt Peace Accord.42 Although it provided temporary peace
between both sides, this truce would only last three years.
The Second Chechen War would prove to be more costly due to influence and rise of new
non-state actors and new forms of warfare. During the first Chechen War, Wahhabi militants
from Saudi Arabia joined the Chechen separatists to support their cause to secede from Russia by
giving them access to financial resources, weapons, and trained terrorists.43 The Wahhabi
militants were drawn to the Chechen cause in light of the fact that its population was
predominantly Muslim – this would give them the chance to spread the message of Islamic jihad
on an international scale.44 Although the Chechens were grateful for this opportunity to receive
aid, their main priority was to seek separation from Russia.45 Chechens were mainly preoccupied
with gaining secession from Russia, not with sponsoring any religious messages. During the
period of 1996 – 1999, Chechnya still could not recover from the first war and was suffering
from high crime rates, kidnappings, poverty, and attacks on foreign aid workers.46 This chaotic
atmosphere served as the perfect environment for the emergence of a different form of political
Islam, which promoted a state governed by Islamic law in order to establish piety, solidarity, and
mutual welfare within the Chechen region.47 As a result, the Chechen insurgency had integrated
ties with Al Qaeda, Al-Qaeda affiliated organizations, and Chechen warlords.48 This alliance
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with other non-state actors provided the line of support the Chechen insurgent movement needed
to challenge the inadequacy of the Chechen state actors.
The rise of religious interests within Chechen insurgency would remain prevalent and
debatable throughout the Russo-Chechen conflict. The new combination of nationalist and
religious attachments would play a role in the outbreak of the Second Chechen war.49 In August
1999, radical Islamists from Chechnya enacted revolts in the neighboring Russian republic of
Dagestan.50 The lack of stability within the Chechen Republic led to Russia’s decision to send
another intervention within the region.51 While the first Chechen war occurred for the sake of
restoring law and order within the Chechen Republic, the Second Chechen war occurred as a
necessity to quell terrorist demands.52 Although the Wahhabis promoted their cause and
convinced Chechen insurgent fighters to support it, it does not appear to be the main motivation
for Chechens to engage in combat with Russia.53 It has been noted that Chechen rebels downplay
the significance of Wahhabi militants within the region as they claim that their main struggle
against Russia is to seek secession.54 Nevertheless, the influence of the Wahhabis did bring about
a new method of warfare that was not used in the first Chechen war – suicide bombing missions.
The impact of the Chechen insurgency and the Wahhabis can be seen through the progression
of female participation within the Chechen nationalist movement. The abuse that Russian troops
committed towards Chechens would provide the push needed for Chechen women to participate
49
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in the insurgency.55 The Chechen conflict launched Chechen women into the role as vocal
representatives within the public sphere.56 Female insurgents were initially used to supply
medical aid, food, and water to the men; they also carried weapons and ammunition across
enemy territory throughout both Chechen wars.57 These would be the first steps taken by
Chechen women in becoming involved in an insurgent movement that would eventually beget
their willingness to engage in terrorist activities. Gonzalez-Perez discusses how Chechen women
would take up arms and train to become soldiers and fighters.58 The influence of the Wahhabis’
warfare tactics caused enlisted women to become the primary forces in suicide missions.59 The
label of “Black Widows” perfectly reflected the high percentage of females who lost their
husbands in the military conflict.60 The Black Widows evolved into becoming the primal
instrument and symbol of the Chechen terrorist jihad.61 This also illustrates a new norm for
Chechen women in having dominant militant roles to engage in acts of violence for the sake of
gaining victory for a non-state actor.
c. Comparative Analysis of Colombian and Chechen Insurgencies
The birth stages of insurgent groups within Colombia and Chechnya were able to gain
momentum because of the lack of capability on the state actors’ part to serve and provide for its
civilians. In the case of Colombia, the nation became involved in a civil war due to the absence
55
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of agreement between two political parties that could not come to terms on how to run
Colombia’s government. Consequently, many people would suffer greatly as this period
produced massive chaos and deaths. In the case of the Chechen republic, its population sought
independence from Russia because the state failed to serve and provide for the Chechens, a nonRussian ethnicity. The majority of Colombians and Chechens suffered from negligence and
exclusion from their governments and therefore pursued other alternative methods that would
recognize and satisfy their needs. Both insurgencies share similarities in the sense that they
sought to obtain their demands through non-peaceful measures. The FARC insurgency and
Chechen insurgency were very popular amongst civilians because they displayed themselves as
the solution to acknowledge and ease the plight of civilians, while reiterating the burdens that
were being caused by government negligence. As a result, both movements embraced the claim
that non-state actors can fix the failures of state actors.
Although Colombian and Chechen insurgencies originally sought to accomplish different
objectives, they stirred the same reaction from outside state actors and they both ended up being
classified as terrorist forces. For Colombia, FARC was created in order to improve the
circumstances of poor and oppressed Colombians through reformed measures of social,
economic, and political means. The civil conflict that arose between FARC guerrillas and
Colombian government troops, along with the FARC collaboration with the narcotics business
prompted assumptions that the FARC insurgency threatened international security. This caused
FARC to receive the terrorist label. For Chechnya during the first war, the insurgency
endeavored to defeat Russian intervention by engaging in combat for the sake of achieving
independence. The second Chechen war was mostly defined by new modes of warfare such as
suicide bombing in order to spread and promote an Islamic jihad message. The intention of
13

gaining secession from Russia seemed to be overlooked and ignored. Hence, Chechen insurgents
would also be labeled as terrorists.
Both the Colombian civil conflict and Chechen wars caused many female victims of warfare
to join the insurgent movements. Instead of remaining voiceless throughout the ongoing conflict,
Colombian women joined the FARC to become guerrilleras and Chechen women joined the
insurgency as suicide bombers (later called the Black Widows). The acknowledgement of FARC
guerrilleras and Black Widows made by the media, non-governmental organizations, and
scholarly research expose the consequences of state actors’ mistreatment of women prior and
during the civil conflicts within Colombia and Chechnya. The rise and benefits of Colombian
and Chechen insurgencies through female recruitment will be the next discussion of this paper.
II.

Benefits of Female Recruitment & Motivations within Colombian and Chechen
Insurgencies

a. Female Recruitment & Motives for FARC Insurgency
Rise and Benefits of Female Terrorism for FARC Insurgency
By presenting themselves as the utopic solution for Colombia’s illegitimate domestic
policies, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia became an attractive non-state actor
for guerrilla recruitment. According to Herrera and Porch, FARC was successful in pointing out
the flaws of Colombian governance – social inequality, violence from right-wing Colombian
army and paramilitary groups, ethnic and racial grievances within indigenous and AfroColombian communities, limited education and job opportunities.62 This statement
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acknowledges the correlation between civilians’ ethnic/racial heritage and poverty within
Colombia. It also proves that state actors governing Colombia have failed to recognize and enact
policies that would implement egalitarian outcomes. FARC has served as an alternative form of
law and order by having control and running schools, courts, and broadcast stations.63 This
demonstrates that FARC identifies neglectful institutions and present themselves as the viable
solution for Colombians to experience social reform. FARC’s staunch support for land reform,
improving social welfare and state control of natural resources would eventually attract
Colombian women.64 By 2002, female members made up between 40% - 45% of the 18,000
FARC members.65 The FARC propaganda was successful in recruiting women to join their
insurgent cause.
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia reaped many positive outcomes and
benefits from recruiting and training female guerrilleras. According to a former FARC company
commander, it was essential for women to be involved in order to strengthen FARC’s role upon
Colombian society.66 Although Colombian paramilitaries do include some women among their
ranks, between twenty-five and fifty percent of FARC guerrillas are female.67 This indicates that
women are not equally recruited into state-led military forces. By joining FARC, women can
play a vital role in increasing the influence and actions of a non-state actor group within a
country. According to Boyes, the purpose of having FARC guerrilleras were to fight, replenish
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the ranks, nurse the wounded, and sustain morale amongst FARC male combatants.68 FARC
female members performed a variety of roles within the organization and not confined to the
caregiving, nurturing role that is usually assigned to females. Guerrilleras softened the perception
of FARC’s notoriety by participating in photo-ops and interacting with civilians in FARCcontrolled territories.69 FARC used these images to their advantage, demonstrating to Colombian
communities that they were nothing like the state-led troops. It also assisted in showing the
public that FARC did not discriminate its membership based on gender. Furthermore, female
fighters served as liaisons in taking care of the interests and safety of female civilians and
mediating domestic and community disputes.70 Under FARC, guerrilleras adopted new roles as
representatives of a non-state actor group by promoting the message of FARC’s goals and
accomplishments. Another plus was that guerrilleras forced the Colombian military to engage in
violence with members considered non-combatants.71 Colombia’s government troops would
inevitably face guerrilleras in combat, proving that guerrilleras were adept in undermining
Colombian state security.
FARC has been effective in its endeavors of recruiting guerrilleras since they address the
obstacles and discrimination that many Colombian women endure. Eighty percent of guerrilleras
were from a peasant background, indicating that women were suffering poor socioeconomic
circumstances.72 The message of FARC for reforms and social justice appealed to women who
were ignored. FARC’s stance on gender equality also permitted women to escape from the social
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norms of machismo.73 FARC gave women the opportunity to be liberated economically and
socially. FARC also distributed pamphlets to the public showing statistics concerning poverty
rates, forced displacement, and how women are more likely than men to be victims of homicides
and sexual violence.74 The statistics also claim how women are more likely than men to be heads
of the household, thus being the sole breadwinners for their family.75 The distribution of these
pamphlets reveals that FARC is targeting specific demographics within the country that are
being oppressed by careless state actors. This also shows that FARC is reaching out to women by
portraying themselves as the rightful group to rally behind. According to an interview with a
FARC leader, he states, “a woman perceives injustice through every pore in her body; from the
moment she is born, she is discriminated against”.76 By reaching out to women, FARC has been
able to gain a huge number of new members to participate in its organization.

Improving Gender Equality
Many women seek to join the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia because of
the potential egalitarian benefits that they have the potential to gain. FARC portrays itself as the
perfect remedy for permitting women to gain autonomy, sexual freedom, and the opportunity to
prove themselves as capable as male guerrillas.77 This form of empowerment permits them to
take unorthodox positions not usually available to women, such as commanding guerrilla
fronts.78 As a guerrillera, a Colombian woman can assist in rebelling against state actors that
were irresponsible in addressing the machismo culture and other sexist norms. FARC
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Commander Andres Paris said that the increase in female enrollment within the insurgency was
due to its support for gender equality.79 The invisibility of access to economic, political, and
social rights was considered a huge motive for women to join FARC.80 Welsh observes that the
majority of the insurgent members (both male and female) are indigenous or Afro-Colombian,
displaying that FARC does not show discrimination towards these marginalized groups either.81
It can be inferred that these women seek to participate in insurgent activities with great optimism
and hope. FARC gives them the chance to find their own strength by carrying out actions that
defend its revolutionary ideals.
By joining FARC, female civilians are rebelling against the status quo of the constrictions
imposed to their gender. According to Gonzalez-Perez, guerrilleras claimed that FARC made
them feel liberated from the repressive macho tendencies that are normal within Colombia.82 She
cites the opinion of anthropologist Maria Eugenia Vasquez, who states that “in a country where
women are usually ignored, guerrilleras are surrounded by symbols that give them an identity”.83
This opinion successfully summarizes the lack of support that females receive from Colombian
society and feel that this insurgency will befit their social needs. Many Colombian females are
raised to believe that marriage and pregnancy are the means of securing their identities.84 This
shows that there are limited options available for female civilians to choose from. Marriage and
motherhood seem to be the only choices for Colombian women to assert their gender identity
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and gain some value within society. Guerrilleras also claimed that joining this insurgent group
gave them the chance to prove their worth as women, thus helping them pursue a different sense
of gender identity.85 Guerrilleras are rebelling against both state corruption and hyper-masculine
social norms – by steering away from marriage and motherhood, female insurgents are willing to
explore different gender identity norms that are unconventional and unique from the culture they
grew up in. Some women truly believed that joining the FARC insurgency would lead them to
do meaningful work that would make their lives fulfilling.86 This reveals that most female
insurgents would like to improve their own lives and the lives of others through social reform. It
can be argued that the inclusion of women within the public sphere will lead to the rise of more
awareness to the plight of the majority of Colombians that are withstanding the consequences of
corruption and injustices.
The transition from being civilian to being guerrillera has proven to have a positive
impact for some female insurgents. A FARC guerrilla leader named Joaquín Gomez supports the
notion that female guerrilleras are invaluable to FARC, since they are also part of the “people’s
war”.87 The leader is referring to the struggle between poor civilians marginalized by Colombian
state policies. This phrase also dares to suggest that the justification to leave women invisible
within the insurgency fight is not the right path. It has been noted that guerrilleras are aware of
the challenges of living in the jungle and the need to adopt a different lifestyle when carrying out
insurgent activities, but most guerrilleras are content with this work.88 Female insurgents have
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given this a lot of thought prior to making a decision in joining the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia. Furthermore, FARC guerrilleras claim that they truly have an
equal stance with male guerrilla members since their responsibilities vary from performing guard
duty, gathering intelligence, fighting in combat, and serving as field commanders.89 These tasks
are very essential within the operations of an insurgent organization in order to remain effective
and successful. Therefore, guerrilleras appear very content in gaining new skills and adopting a
stronger confidence in their gender identities that would not have occurred if they remained
civilians.
Despite the benefits of having an insurgent group claiming to support egalitarian notions,
FARC has been criticized for not maintaining them. A guerrillera named Olga explained how
FARC has made little effort in promoting gender equality because guerrilleras were expected to
never disagree with their male counterparts during a meeting.90 Unfortunately, not every female
insurgent is experiencing a fair relationship with their fellow male comrades. The prevalent view
that Colombian women are weaker and vulnerable gives many male guerrilla members a difficult
time to treat female combatants with respect.91 It is possible that most FARC commanders
presume every guerrilla is treated fairly, thus not making a conscious effort to encourage gender
equality. Most male guerrilla members are not accustomed to treating women equally, so this
definitely can create strained relations between male and female insurgents. Another guerrillera
named Cristina revealed how she had to go through a painful and risky late-term abortion
because having a baby would have impeded her to carry out her duties as a FARC insurgent
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member.92 Her account is one of the many that contradict the claim that FARC supports the idea
that female insurgents have sole control over their reproductive rights. Another factor that has
caused FARC to face severe scrutiny is the age of the insurgents they recruit. Jordan observed
how many FARC guerrilleras join the insurgency in their teenage years.93 Most of them join for
a variety of reasons such as boredom, to pursue an alternative lifestyle other than marriage, or
were easily impressed by FARC’s ideology.94 These observations indicate that FARC does not
take into consideration the age of the civilians that seek to join them, proving to be detrimental to
their image as taking advantage by using child soldiers (both male and female) to gain more
insurgent fighters. This provides further elucidation as to why it is problematic for domestic and
international state actors to recognize and legitimize the FARC insurgency.

Limited Opportunities
The lack of educational and socioeconomic opportunities is one of the most impacting
reasons for female civilians to join the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.
Gonzalez-Perez states that education is not available to girls within Colombia’s rural
population.95 Statistics show that wages for Colombian women are sixty percent lower than
Colombian men and illiteracy is six percent higher among women than men.96 Colombian
females do not have the luxury for socioeconomic mobility, therefore they are more likely to
remain impoverished. As a result, many females join FARC due to the lack of access to a better
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future.97 The FARC insurgency seems to illuminate a positive message that its members can
escape from the stagnant hold of poverty. The Human Rights Watch testifies that younger people
join non-state military forces in response to the deficiency of resources within rural
communities.98 This can be exemplified by a guerrillera named Laura, who left her rural
community to participate in the FARC insurgency because it would provide more prospects for
her rather than remaining at home.99 FARC exhibits itself as a reliable force that will not shirk
away from responsibilities towards providing relief to the Colombian population. Another
guerrillera named María Clara believed that joining FARC would give her a better chance at
achieving her dream of becoming a doctor.100 Although she was aware that the insurgency would
not openly give her immediate access to studying medicine, it was a better option than to remain
destitute.101 Having little access to education endeavors and socioeconomic mobility proves to
have detrimental effects for Colombian women.
The lack of resources for social mobility signals the increase in Colombian female
numbers to seek refuge within FARC guerrilla forces. De La Vega remarks how many young
members of FARC apparently had only three choices when their parents were killed by the
ongoing civil conflict – join the guerrillas, join a street gang, or prostitution.102 These options
were the only way for them to find the means to survive. Tabak discusses how women joined
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FARC out of fear of becoming a victim of guerrilla warfare.103 The chaos and violence between
both government-sponsored troops and guerrilla forces pushed women to seek out the protection
of an armed group. A former female ex-combatant spoke about how a FARC guerrilla member
would drop by her house to discuss the benefits of getting an education through FARC
membership, especially since her hometown could not afford to educate the youth.104 Although
FARC is armed and dangerous, it seems to be the only reliable actor to provide some aid to
Colombians. Tabak observed how both male and female combatants share the same reasons for
becoming guerrillas – lack of education and opportunity, dedication to FARC’s ideology, and
fighting for social reform.105 According to Welsh, poor, rural women can alleviate their troubles
by becoming FARC guerrilleras.106 Welsh continues saying that women joining FARC represent
the lack of options available for women and the need for change within Colombian society.107
Having limited opportunity creates the perfect environment for breeding civil conflict and the
rise of non-state actors such as the FARC insurgency.

Victims of Family Abuse
Another main motive that prompted females to join the FARC insurgency was the
hardships of living in an unstable and abusive environment at home. Demobilized FARC female
combatants confessed that they suffered from early childhood abuse from close family
members.108 Many women interviewed came from bad domestic situations such as being under
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the care of neglectful relatives.109 FARC offered a precious sanctuary that gave women the
chance to be independent from hostile environments. Welsh points out how Colombian females
are prone to be victims of verbal abuse and domestic violence inflicted by male relatives as a
way to establish dominant control within the household.110 A former FARC combatant named
Isabel confessed how her father abused her from a very young age and continued to do so until
she joined FARC.111 She felt a sense of empowerment and strength and she was convinced that
her father could not hurt her or anyone else – FARC was the perfect escape from her situation.112
These interviews point out how brave these combatants are as they were willing to participate in
a non-state actor group to receive protection and independence. It also demonstrates that female
combatants do not have accessible or available social programs that can provide them counseling
and protection from their abusive relatives.
The FARC insurgency unintentionally served as a haven that permitted its female
combatants to heal from their abuse. Joining FARC was a form of rebellion against the unhealthy
lifestyle that some females were forced to acquiesce to.113 According to an interview with a
FARC female combatant, Viviana spoke about the time when she was introduced to the FARC
guerrilla forces, and felt that she could identify with their ideology.114 She strongly believed that
she encountered the love of a family through her comrades.115 Another guerrillera named María
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claimed that joining the FARC insurgency served as the perfect flight for her to escape from the
abuse she endured while living with her grandmother.116 The irony presented is that despite the
risks and dangers that the FARC insurgency contained, María felt it was a safer place than her
home.117 Herrera and Porch analyze how some statistics gathered on motivations for enlistment
are not always accurate.118 For instance, among the demobilized FARC combatants (both male
and female) that surrendered between January 2006 – April 2006, only four percent claimed that
living in an abusive environment was their main motivation to become guerrillas. However,
fifty-five percent of these combatants claimed to have suffered physical and verbal abuse as
children.119 These interviews show that addressing domestic violence is taboo and somewhat
considered a social norm within Colombian society. It also shows that more quantitative analyses
are needed to further explore and comprehend which specific or amalgamation of reasons are
prevalent in the decision-making process for females to become guerrilleras.

Positive Role Models
An interesting motive that caused females to participate in the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia was to the exposure of positive role models already involved
within the insurgency. A FARC guerrillera named Camila was first exposed to FARC ideologies
through her parents, who were members of the Communist Party.120 Although her father would
be killed by paramilitary forces, Camila still joined FARC because she believed it was necessary
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to bring forth change within Colombia.121 Camila sought to be in the insurgency to implement
social reform based on the ideology her father taught her. Another guerrillera named Lucia had a
positive experience with FARC since her father was acquainted with one of the FARC
commanders and she would accompany him to their camps.122 This demonstrates that some
guerrilleras were actually encouraged by their parents to fight for social justice and equality
through the insurgency. According to some testimonies, some FARC guerrilleras grew up in
villages controlled by FARC guerrillas and saw how these women wore uniforms and were
armed like their male counterparts.123 They considered these women as symbols of strength,
beauty, and role models to look up to.124 Being exposed to such strong imagery had a tremendous
impact on these girls as they saw the potential of what they could become. Another FARC
combatant named Elena told how she grew up seeing guerrilleras of Afro-Colombian descent
wearing uniforms and rifles, looking like glamorous figures.125 These interviews are a good
reflection of how positive role models can invoke ordinary and marginalized female individuals
to become important figures in pushing for equality and reform.

Colombian State Troops and Paramilitary Forces – Perpetrators of Violence
The gruesome actions carried out by government-led troops and paramilitary forces
caused many Colombian women to become victims of violent crimes. Paramilitary forces are
other non-state actors encouraged by the Colombian Army as an alternative to perform counter-
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insurgency operations.126 Like FARC, paramilitary groups receive some support and
collaboration from drug traffickers, but their sole purpose is to target and eradicate leftist
guerrilla groups.127 Herman states that both paramilitaries and government-led troops appear
united in eradicating leftist forces, especially the FARC insurgency.128 This demonstrates that
Colombian state actors are willing to cooperate with a non-state actor as long as their interests
are not threatened. Colombian paramilitary groups are notorious for raping, murdering, and
mutilating women.129 In an interview with a guerrillera named Soraida, she discussed how the
army took her brother and falsely accused him of being a guerrilla, only to shoot him six times in
front of the whole town.130 This prompted her to join FARC as a way to get revenge.131 The
crimes committed by government troops and paramilitaries partly reveal why insurgencies are
formed and gain a huge amount of support from many Colombians. By participating in FARC,
women no longer have to remain victimized by soldiers and paramilitary troops and are given the
opportunity to fight back.
The actions of all armed groups within Colombia, including FARC, have come under
strict scrutiny to identify any human rights violations. Amnesty International claims that between
sixty and seventy percent of Colombian women experience sexual violence in their lives.132 The
official figures presented by the Colombian government do not accurately measure the epidemic
of sexual violence within the country due to the victims remaining silent about their rape
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experiences, lack of autopsy reports recording physical evidence of sexual assault, and failure to
hold perpetrators accountable.133 According to the 2003 UNDP Human Development Report on
Colombia, the number of women killed outside of combat increased by twenty percent during
2000 – 2002.134 Within this timeframe, women accounted for six percent of all deaths in and out
of combat and disappearance, ten percent of tortures, eleven percent of all land-mine related
deaths and eighteen percent of kidnappings.135 This evidence uncovers the deleterious
consequences of a country failing to resolve a civil conflict. Violence against women is an
effective instrument to instill fear among civilians.136 In 2003, over 220 women were killed
outside of combat and twenty women disappeared.137 State-led troops were responsible for five
percent of these killings, paramilitary forces caused twenty-six percent of these killings, and
guerrilla forces caused sixteen percent of the killings.138 These quantitative findings provide
proof that FARC portrays itself as the protector of Colombians, yet it carries out the same violent
tactics that both soldiers and paramilitary members inflict on civilians.

Coercive Measures – Payment and Abuse
There have been controversial accounts acknowledging that FARC used coercive
methods in order to gain more combatants. According to De La Vega, the deserters interviewed
asserted that they became guerrillas forcefully because FARC was threatening their family.139
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Other deserters said that they had to join because of their families lacking the means to pay taxes
to FARC.140 It is known that some girls are given by their parents into armed services as a form
of tax payment to the armed group that controls the area.141 This shows that FARC uses slavery
as a means to gain more people to assist with the operations of their insurgent activities. Despite
its vocal position for equality and social change, FARC has failed to respect the free will of
individuals. This form of extortion also implies that FARC is lacking the finances necessary to
fund insurgent activities and are probably not very popular with certain towns and villages.
Another account given by Rosa revealed how her abusive father joined FARC and got some
guerrillas to kidnap and subject her to verbal and physical abuse.142 This portrays FARC as the
least safe haven for females to seek refuge in. They also had Rosa’s sister captive, and she tried
to commit suicide.143 This exposes FARC to be a violent perpetrator no better than state-led
troops and paramilitary groups.
These coercive and violent deeds committed by the FARC insurgency caused both
Colombians and outsiders to question whether the insurgent group remains devoted to its original
agenda. There are reports that FARC commanders force their female combatants to use
contraception and have abortions.144 Other women have been victimized by guerrilla attacks
based on reports that place them fraternizing with government troops or paramilitaries.145
According to a report conducted by Amnesty International, both guerrilla and paramilitary
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groups in Colombia recruit women and girls in their ranks that were sexually abused by their
fellow male comrades.146 This puts guerrilleras in a position to be both victims and perpetrators
of insurgent violence. Tabak admits that a huge distortion is presented when figuring out whether
or not the public should view FARC guerrilleras as victims that were forced to carry out FARC
actions or persons who acted out their desire to fight as perpetrators.147 These accounts only
place the blame on FARC male combatants, not female combatants. Tabak also criticizes how
most non-government organizations fail to discuss the status of women as female combatants.148
Most reports made by human rights organizations have the propensity to ignore the precarious
role of female fighters.149 This indicates that more qualitative and quantitative research are
needed to examine if FARC female combatants seek to join the insurgency in order to inflict
dominant behavior on others, and whether or not they force other female civilians to join FARC
by whatever means necessary.
b. Female Recruitment & Motives for Chechen Insurgency
Rise and Benefits of Female Terrorism for Chechen Insurgency
The involvement of Chechen women in the conflict against Russia was a gradual process.
Bodansky argues that the consequences of the first Chechen War were far greater than the
second war, yet it did not witness any suicide bombings.150 Weinberg and Eubank’s Black
Widows case study revealed that an increase of female participation in suicide attacks were
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invisible until 2005.151 The evidence presented by Bodansky, Weinberg, and Eubank displays
that Chechen women were not always involved in the separatist cause from the commencement
of the first Chechen War. They still endured the consequences of the war outbreaks with Russia
and patriarchal norms still governed their way of life. Weinberg and Eubank believe that women
usually tend to be late-comers to terrorism.152 This may have to do with the fact that women were
not seen as possible prospects or influential enough to be useful in the Chechen nationalist
movement. The Second Chechen War was primarily Islamist in character and exploited religious
devotion as well as shame and despair to drive women to attempt martyrdom in Chechnya.153
The role of Islamic jihad justified Chechen women to sacrifice themselves for their loss of loved
ones, nationalist beliefs, and served as a prominent tool in altering the gender norm as they
engaged in terrorist acts. Whereas the first Chechen war caused women to be perceived as
victims, the second Chechen war opened a new role for women to become perpetrators of
terrorism.
Chechen women were already exposed to the Chechen insurgent movement through personal
ties. According to Murphy, networking is identified as a successful tool for Chechen women to
engage in terrorism.154 Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev used local representatives to identify,
target, and cultivate female recruits; this was accomplished by exploiting their personal needs,
weaknesses, grievances, friendships, allegiances, family obligations, traditional Chechen culture,
and Muslim beliefs.155 The role that these local representatives played in reaching out to
potential Black Widows would have a tremendous effect in prompting these women to recognize
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the significance and potential benefits of engaging in terrorist activities. Although these local
representatives seem to play a small role, they were essential for the Chechen insurgency to
remain significant amongst the Chechen population. These local representatives exhibit the
effective role that non-state actors can have upon a specific demographic that has been constantly
neglected by state actors. The significance of kinship can be seen through a study conducted by
Speckhard and Akhmedova, which revealed that twenty-seven percent of the female suicide
bombers were affiliated with the Wahhabis by marriage or family ties but later began to become
more deeply invested in seeking the terror-promoting aspects of these groups.156 By having
personal attachments with the Wahhabis, Chechen women were exposed to both the nationalist
and Islamic incentives for martyrdom. This demonstrates the prominent role that kinship played
on Chechen women to become exposed to influential ideology leading them to participate in
terrorist activities.
The Chechen nationalist movement would eventually recognize the benefits of recruiting
women in their insurgent activities. Cunningham identifies the following reasons for terrorist
organizations to recruit women to commit violent acts: the perception of their gender to be
considered non-threatening, the tendency for women to be treated with more consideration when
it comes to body cavity searches and the ability to appear pregnant can assist women to conceal
weapons and bombs.157 In the case of Chechnya, the active role of the Black Widows committing
terrorist acts would provoke a strong outcry from the public. Out of all the Chechen suicide
attacks that occurred within June 2000 – June 2005, forty-three percent of them were carried out
by the Black Widows in public places such as subway stations, military checkpoints, music and
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religious festivals.158 Cunningham, Speckhard, and Akhmedova agree that the Black Widows
were effective terrorists and reliable actors in promoting Chechen secession. The popular opinion
still considers women as victims of violence, not as perpetrators.159 This verifies that the topic of
female terrorism still remains a new social norm for the public to accept. Nevertheless, the
actions of the Black Widows exhibit that female civilians are capable of becoming terrorist
perpetrators and can make a non-state actor become stronger in fighting against a repressive state
actor.

Role of Religion
One of the main motives identified as the primary influence for Chechen women to join
the insurgent movement is based upon the role of religion. The Second Chechen War was
strongly identified as being driven primarily by Islamist ties and exploited religious devotion to
drive women to undergo suicide missions in Chechnya.160 The faith of Islam was used to justify
Chechen women in sacrificing themselves. It would also serve as a prominent tool in altering the
gender norm as they engaged in terrorist acts. The oppressive circumstances of war and the
influence of Islam introduced and legitimized the idea of self-cleansing through martyrdom
bombing.161 Convincing women that becoming a suicide bomber was an act of religious duty
inferred that it was an obligation to be carried out. This approach does not improve gender status,
but merely serves as a reminder to Chechen women that obedience was always expected from
them.
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Another reason the Chechen insurgency gained support was the perception that their
religious ways were being threatened by Russian intervention. For some women, the jihad
message encouraged by the Wahhabis demonstrated the need for an Islam revival in Chechnya to
unite religious identity within the region.162 Russian intervention meant that they could not
practice Islam – this was an ultimate attack against their pursuit to remain faithfully devout.163
The Black Widows seemed to comprehend that maintaining their religious ties to Islam was
essential in order to accomplish the goal of gaining Chechen state sovereignty. Nivat points out
that the relationship between nationalism and religion elucidates the reason why the Chechen
wars commenced and how Chechen women became engaged in terrorist activities.164 According
to Gonzalez-Perez, most Chechen women followed Sufism (the dominant form of Islam in
Chechnya), which does not support martyrdom and strictly prohibits suicide – Wahhabism
supports the opposite of this.165 The clash between these two different forms of Islam reveals
why the Chechen insurgency remained neutral in order to prevent division within the Chechen
population.
Martyrdom is also identified as another significant variable for Chechen women to become
Black Widows. Bloom examines how Abu Walid, a Saudi rebel commander, said that the wives
of the martyred mujahedeen were menaced by Russian soldiers who threatened their honor in
their own homes.166 These women would not accept being humiliated and live under the
occupation, so they used martyrdom as a remedy to serve the cause of God and avenge their
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husbands and sons.167 Victimized women would have their honor restored through martyrdom
for the cause of Chechen secession. This account also reveals the significance of the role that
Wahhabi Islam played during the Chechen conflict, serving as a justification for Chechen women
to commit terrorist acts. According to Chechen sources, many of the women were victims of
rape, which meant that they could never marry or have children, thus martyrdom appeared to be
the only solution.168 This also indicates that the only form of emancipation that Chechen women
could receive would be obtained through their willingness to sacrifice their lives. Speckhard and
Akhmedova discovered evidence of women self-recruitment and strong willingness to martyr
themselves on behalf of their country and independence from Russia, to enact social justice, and
to avenge for the loss of loved ones in their families.169 This analysis seems to support the
possibility that Black Widows were motivated by more than one reason to become terrorists for
the Chechen insurgency.

Revenge
Another motive identified as the primary influence for Chechen women to join the
insurgent movement is to gain revenge. Recruiters routinely target young women who have lost
someone during the war.170 Chechen terrorist leaders emphasized the fact that many of the
female suicide attackers acted following the death of a family member – usually their husbands –
because of this conflict.171 This form of vulnerability was the perfect way for the Chechen
insurgent movement to gain more female members, especially since most deceased family
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members supported Chechnya’s secession. By framing the death of a family member as a threat
to the honor of Chechen women, terrorist leaders promoted the notion that women should
become suicide bombers in order to serve the group.172 Their personal sufferings were an
essential recruitment tool aimed to provoke fear among the Russians to push them to recognize
Chechen statehood. By becoming Black Widows, Chechen women were able to take some
control and no longer had to be victimized by the sufferings they endured throughout the
conflict. According to a study conducted by O’Rourke, it was discovered that eighty-eight
percent of the suicide attackers had experienced the death of an immediate family member in the
Chechen-Russian conflict and forty-seven percent of them had more than one family member
killed.173 These staggering statistics indicate that these personal losses prompted Chechen
women to relinquish the patriarchal norms established within their society to pursue terrorist acts
for the sake of raising nationalist awareness within Russia. These personal losses have been
capitalized by several of the terrorist groups to attract female attackers for the insurgent cause.174
Participants of the Chechen insurgency gradually began to realize the potential effect that suicide
bombers could have in promoting their cause.
The death of a family member is considered a powerful motivation for Chechen women
to become suicide bombers because it proves the consequences of becoming victimized by a civil
conflict. Although Chechen society encourages the duty of getting revenge, women were not
expected to do this.175 This social norm would definitely be challenged throughout the Chechen
wars. Due to the severe casualties being caused by this conflict and the popular militant jihadist
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ideology promoted by the Wahhabis within Chechen rebel groups, many women self-recruited
and took part in suicide terrorism as a means of revenge against the Russian military.176 Having
the opportunity to get revenge allowed the Black Widows a doorway to break another patriarchal
norm which constrained gender roles. According to Cunningham, the impact of the death of a
loved one or being the victim of a violent crime are the usual explanations when trying to fathom
the reasons why women become involved in terrorist organizations.177 Bloom states that the
female operatives in Chechnya were involved in performing acts of terrorism because many were
the sisters, mothers, or wives of Chechen men killed in battle by federal Russian troops.178 The
tragedy that Chechen women succumb to dehumanizes them, making insurgent activities a likely
solution to overcome their grief and cope with their loss.
Scholars have challenged the idea of religious duty being considered the prevalent factor
in the rise of female suicide bombers within the Chechen insurgency by claiming revenge to be a
stronger and more likely factor. Female Muslims were received by the Chechen insurgency as a
result of an opportunistic method.179 This shows that it didn’t really matter if the female
insurgents were truly devoted to the right for Chechnya’s solidarity; as long as they sought to
commit themselves to complete a suicide bombing in the name of Chechen insurgency, there was
no need to examine or look into how nationalist female recruits truly were. Murphy also presents
Chechen ethnographer Zalpa Bersanova’s argument in which she has found no correlation
between personal wartime losses and resentment towards Russian civilians.180 This demonstrates
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that even though the Black Widows commit terrorist acts, they only sought the attention of the
Russian government and its leaders who controlled Chechen sovereignty.
The sentiments of revenge provided the perfect emotional conditions for Chechen women
to commit themselves to terrorist acts. Bloom believes that Russian military actions played a
significant role in traumatizing and stressing women to seek revenge, making them easy to
persuade them to carry out a suicide mission.181 This proves that women do not automatically
enact on their religious beliefs when it comes to suffering from a personal loss. Murphy presents
a psychological opinion by Dr. Baiev, who states that Chechen suicide bombings are “largely
motivated by a desire to take revenge for a family member killed by the Russians…Blood
revenge, rather than religious extremism imported from the Middle East, governs the
violence”.182 This quote supports the claim that the religious objective that the Wahhabis
intended to carry out through the Chechen conflict would be overlooked by Chechen members
since they were driven by personal reasons rather than the Islamic jihad cause to fight the
Russians. It also presents another idea that suicide bombing isn’t always committed by the
driving mechanism of religion. There were also positive correlations between the endorsement
for revenge and increasing levels of religiosity, aggression, suspiciousness, and negativism.183
This study also demonstrated the strong role that other psychological factors such as emotions
and the personal state of mind played for Chechen women when transitioning into the Black
Widows.

181

Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 65.
Paul Murphy, Allah's Angels: Chechen Women in War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 213.
183
Anne Speckhard & Khapta Akhmedova, Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? ed. Yoram Schweitzer. (Tel
Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2006), 68.
182

38

Psychological Impact – Victims of Rape, Isolation, and Trauma
Rape was used as a violent tool during the Chechen wars and influenced Chechen women to
become Black Widows. Zhirkova claims that Chechen women were kidnapped and raped by
Russian soldiers during detention and as part of the campaign to ethnically cleanse certain
areas.184 Even same-side rapes were committed and occasionally videotaped to make it
impossible for the victims to return to their families, thus making martyrdom the only attractive
solution.185 If a woman is raped and it is filmed, she can be blackmailed into doing anything
because it is regarded as a dishonor to her entire family.186 This shows that a strong correlation
between rape and martyrdom existed, causing Chechen women to become involved in terrorism
as a result of being victimized and seeking to restore their honor. This correlation also supports
the alternate explanation that victimized females became Black Widows by personal motives, not
because of the plight of Chechen independence. Speckhard and Akhmedova observe that many
Russian journalists reported how Chechen women were kidnapped, raped, and/or drugged in
order to take part in terror activities, yet they did not discover any evidence that proved this.187
This demonstrates how the Russian media sought to control the narrative of female members
within Chechen insurgent groups as a means to prevent Russians from questioning its’ policy
stance over Chechnya’s independence. The prevalence of Russian propaganda plays a key role in
distorting the role of Chechen female terrorists as victims of violence, not as insurgents for state
independence.
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The depiction of all Chechen women being victims of rape during the Chechen wars has
raised some questions in regards to whether or not this influenced their decision to become
suicide bombers. Although there are many documented cases of Russian soldiers raping Chechen
women and Russian media assert that Chechen women were coerced through rape into
committing suicide attacks, there is no direct evidence of any attackers having experienced rape
under these circumstances.188 O’Rourke’s analysis supports the idea that the role of rape during
the Chechen wars has yet to be seen as the most likely root cause for Chechen women joining the
insurgent movement. It also illustrates how discussing rape experiences may be somewhat
considered taboo within Chechen society, yet no scholar or journalist presented within this paper
appears to discuss this social aspect of Chechen culture. Murphy also states that she has not
found any evidence of a Chechen woman becoming a suicide terrorist because she or any
member of her family or friends had been raped by Russian soldiers.189 Furthermore, none of the
suicide bombers captured alive said they planned to kill themselves because they had been raped
by Russian soldiers.190 This contradicts some claims made on how rape played a role in
prompting Chechen women to engage with Chechen insurgents to serve as suicide bombers. It
also verifies the strongest argument that present revenge and trauma as being the main motives
for Chechen women to engage in terrorism willingly.
Specific psychological traits like isolation and trauma are considered huge causes for the
formation of Black Widows. According to another study conducted among Chechen female
suicide bombers, seventy-three percent experienced depression, ninety-two percent experienced
social alienation and isolation, twenty-three percent experienced aggression, and thirty-one
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percent experienced a strong desire for revenge.191 Although revenge still remained a minor role,
the prevalence of depression and social alienation proved to be a toxic combination for female
victims to be attracted to terrorism as a way to take control of their lives. This study also reveals
that most Chechen women were in the ideal psychological condition to be easily targeted and
recruited to complete suicide bombing missions. Bodansky observes how some European
sociologists and psychologists were somewhat biased when studying the Black Widows by
stating that they were driven by despair due to extreme violence toward their families and the
isolation that left them deprived of any perspective or alternative.192 As a result of this isolation,
Chechen women felt vulnerable and sought another mode of support through participating in the
Chechen separatist cause.
The Chechen wars created an oppressive environment that caused most traumatized
Chechens to fight back. Speckhard and Akhmedova conducted several interviews from an
eclectic mix of participants (hostages, Black Widows members, close associates, and family
members of Black Widows) and discovered that all participants experienced deep personal
traumatization, symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, and dissociative phenomena.193
Thus, psychological traumatization is considered the most plausible factor that drew Chechen
women to become suicide bombers.194 The trauma that women experienced during both Chechen
wars prompted them to pursue Chechen insurgency as a chance to become empowered again and
feel some form of community due to the lack of kinship that they were suffering from.
Speckhard and Akhmedova believe that the vital variables that led to Chechen women to become
191
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suicide bombers were through access to a terrorist group ready to equip women on suicide
missions and the exposure to a militant jihadist ideology that resonates with the woman’s
psychological needs.195 Like revenge, both isolation and trauma prove to be very powerful
factors in leading Chechen women to become terrorists. It also exposes the Chechen insurgency
as a neglectful non-state actor for not giving Chechen women the proper assistance needed to
overcome their grief and mental troubles.

Coercive Measures – Brainwashing and Zombification
Another perspective that challenges the notion that the Black Widows chose to engage in
terrorism out of their own free will is the procedure of zombification. This process suggests that
Black Widows were coerced into becoming terrorists, and really had no choice but to accept it. A
Moscow journalist named Svetlana Makunina supported the commonly held Russian view that
the women terrorists had all been turned into zombies because they were coerced by being raped,
drugged, or succumbed to other forceful methods.196 The supposed lack of unity within the
Chechen population can be viewed as a useful tool in showing the public how the chaos within
the Chechen region is due to the lack of cooperation with each other, not with Russia. Another
prominent journalist named Anna Politkovskaya believed that a major motive for the women was
to avenge the deaths of their family members since they were “zombified” by sorrow and
grief.197 The effect of zombification is presented and emphasized within the Russian media in
order to point out that Chechen women were not in a stable mindset when they decided to
become suicide bombers. This presents how psychological factors such as trauma can cause its
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victims to experience mental damage and under high risk of committing violent acts without
guidance and a healthy mindset.
Coercive methods such as drugging and brainwashing are seen as useful tactics for
coercing female victims to become suicide bombers. Journalist Maria Zhirkova believes many
of the women involved are brainwashed by “zombification – there are various ways of drugging
them or enslaving them so they don’t know what they’re doing… it is very difficult for anyone to
understand the low position Chechen women hold in their society”.198 The evidence within
Russian propaganda shows that journalists are going out of their way to portray Chechen female
terrorists in a negative light to point out that Chechen separatist demands are unstable and
unaccounted for. However, using this form of narrative may backlash – it could definitely raise
awareness of the Chechen cause and instead stir sympathy from the public to support Chechen
secession. This also assists in viewing the Black Widows less as perpetrators and more likely to
be seen somewhat as emancipators, since the demand of Chechnya’s independence gives it
ample justification. Murphy also mentions how Chechen insurgent groups were skilled at
brainwashing by injecting women with drugs and successfully convincing them to believe that
dying for Allah would rectify all their mistakes and be considered a great honor, yet no evidence
supports this claim.199 While some Black Widows did commit suicide to serve God, religion
doesn’t seem to be the strongest propensity when evaluating how Black Widows became
effective terrorist actors.
The coercive measures of brainwashing and zombification as the root basis of female
terrorism for Chechen solidarity are controversial amongst scholars. Groskop gives a different
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account of how a few Black Widows were coerced into becoming suicide bombers. She
interviews a woman named Zarema Muzhakhoyeva, who had debts so great that a group of men
that she took a loan from told her she had no choice but to pay them back with her life by
completing a suicide mission.200 This example reveals that not all female recruits had the
freedom and right to choose in joining the Chechen insurgent cause. Far from being freedom
fighters with an equal right to die for their beliefs, Chechnya’s female martyrs are more likely to
be forced, blackmailed, or brainwashed to their deaths.201 This goes against the notion that
Chechen women are somewhat egalitarian and have the freedom to pursue whatever path to
support Chechen independence. The kidnappings committed by federal forces and the horror of
zachistkas (raids led by Russian allied paramilitary forces to apprehend and execute supporters
of Chechen independence) are to blame for the suicide bombings.202 Murphy also mentions how
the brutality of the Russian assault and the mopping-up operations “pushed Chechen women
over the edge”.203 This proves that Russian intervention produced an oppressive force that caused
Chechen women to rebel. Their actions indicate that no brainwashing or zombification methods
were needed to induce Chechen women to join the insurgency. The findings that both Murphy
and Groskop present prove that there are conflicting issues in regards to getting their facts
straight about the true and underlying motivational factors of Chechen women engaging in
terrorism.
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Role of Nationalism
Nationalism is another strong component that encouraged Chechen women to become
suicide bombers. Although the Chechen insurgency was struggling to balance the goals of both
domestic Chechen terrorists and international Wahhabi jihadists, its high level of female activity
was solely focused on the cause for Chechen separatism.204 This embodied the hope and
optimism that Chechen female terrorists felt in fighting for a just cause through committing
violent acts. A female shahida (martyr) summed up the reasons for the Black Widows’
willingness to sacrifice themselves – people were unaware of the innocent people dying in
Chechnya and “therefore, we have chosen this approach... if we die, others will come and follow
us— our brothers and sisters who are willing to sacrifice their lives, in Allah’s way, to liberate
the nation”.205 To die in hope of raising awareness and receiving more support for the Chechen
separatist demand seemed to be a worthy deed that Black Widows were willing to commit in the
name of independence. This also supports Speckhard and Akhmedova’s view that Chechen
women have carried out acts of suicide terrorism from the beginning of this struggle to gain
independence from Russia.206 Moreover, this verifies that nationalism proves to be a motive as
significant as revenge and trauma for Black Widows to join the Chechen insurgents for the sake
of seceding from Russia and have Chechnya become a liberated nation. This specific component
also promotes an attractive feature for non-state actors to gain more adherents to their cause.
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Improving Gender Role
While examining the reasons why women participated in the Chechen independence
movement, a fascinating motive presents itself – the improvement of their gender status. By
recruiting more females, terrorist organizations benefit from increasing their membership and
having some form of advantage over their adversary based on the biased perception of gender.207
Participation in terrorist acts affords Chechen women the chance to challenge the status quo of
their gender norms and demonstrate that they are just as capable as men in carrying out
terrorism. The domestic objective of the Chechen terrorist movement drew women to mobilize
and participate at the highest levels of combat, leadership, and policymaking because they
anticipated the elimination of repression against Chechnya and Chechen women’s
disadvantageous position in society.208 This can be explained by the patriarchal system that
governs Chechen society. Greater responsibilities within the Chechen insurgent movement gave
Chechen women the platform to break away from their constrained gender roles.
It is no surprise that the Black Widows would also seek to accomplish objectives of their own
such as having egalitarian status with men after having proved their devotion to the nationalist
cause. Bloom also points out how women want to become suicide bombers not just in the name
of their country, religion and/or leader, but also in the name of their gender.209 Participating in
terrorist actions may assist in their effort to get the recognition needed in order for them to have
improved gender relations within Chechen society. Speckhard and Akhmedova detect that
Chechen women are more likely to embrace the role of suicide terrorist because the roles of
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being an active combatant are less available for them.210 This indicates that Chechen insurgents
recognized that women served better as suicide bombers since it provoked a bigger reaction from
the public, efficiently promoting their separatist cause. More research is needed for the further
examination as to how much did the perceived idea of improving the rights of women led many
Chechen women to join the insurgent movement.
c. Comparative Analysis of Female Perspectives for Joining Colombian and Chechen
Insurgencies
The Colombian and Chechen insurgencies had different approaches in using female members
to their benefit. Whereas the Chechen separatist movement was initially hesitant in recruiting
female insurgents, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia were determined to reach
out and increase female membership within their guerrilla forces. However, both insurgencies
hold the same stance that including female members produced greater outcomes in getting
attention and promoting the objectives of the insurgent activities. The Chechen insurgent group
really did not give female insurgents a variety of duties outside of suicide bombing missions. No
other research has been presented to determine if using female insurgents for suicide bombings
causes a positive or negative perspective for Chechen female civilians. FARC guerrilleras had
more responsibilities and further inclusion in running insurgent operations in Colombia. This is
what caused some of them to become role models for young Colombian females. There were no
instances of any sort of role model that influenced Chechen women in their decision to become
suicide bombers. This illustrates that non-state actors have a strong impact in assigning new
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gender roles for women. It also serves as a challenging reminder for state actors as to how to deal
with women taking combative positions.
The majority of Chechen Black Widows were mature women while FARC guerrilleras
included teenagers as young as thirteen. No research has shown that the Chechen insurgency was
using female teenagers in becoming suicide bombers. It can be argued that the Chechen
insurgency were somewhat more considerate by picking and allowing members that were adults.
At the same time, FARC guerrilleras admit to fleeing to the insurgency as a means to escape
from abusive homes. The Chechen insurgency served more as an outlet for women to cope with
their grief and get revenge for the death of loved ones. Both Chechen and Colombian combatants
used the insurgency in order to fight against some form of oppression. The Black Widows and
guerrilleras challenged the status quo of women, thus causing a strong outcry by the public since
they transitioned themselves into strong combatants. The Russian media sought to portray the
Black Widows in a negative light in order to prevent the Chechen insurgency from receiving
support. Although the Colombian media portrays FARC guerrilleras with a negative lens, their
strong presence within the insurgency was acknowledged. Both Chechen and Colombian women
experienced marginalization against main state actors that were implementing policies and
operations detrimental to their way of life. Both groups are also similar in the fact that they grew
up in a masculine culture that created unequal gender roles towards women.
The difference between the Black Widows and guerrilleras was that they fought for different
insurgent causes. Chechen insurgency was mainly focused on independence from Russia, while
FARC insurgency focused on fighting for social justice and state reform. Gender equality was a
huge decision factor for Colombian women to become combatants. This presents a huge paradox
since FARC has been classified as a terrorist group and research shows they have not lived up to
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their egalitarian promises. This was not the case for Chechen women, indicating that not all
insurgent groups prioritize and pursue the same objectives. Religious ideology and nationalism
were not prevalent motives for Colombian women to participate in the FARC insurgency. The
lack of educational and socioeconomic prospects created a difficult plight for Colombian women
to overcome, yet Chechen women did not experience this. This suggests that Chechen female
insurgents were mainly focused on accomplishing Chechen statehood. All facts indicate that
despite the different agendas set by these insurgencies, the Black Widows and FARC guerrilleras
were unquestionably committed to fighting for their causes.
Both Chechen and Colombian female insurgents were victimized by perpetrators (state
actors) that sought to eradicate non-state activities that threatened state control. Both groups are
alike in that women had some exposure to these insurgencies through personal ties by relatives
that had some affiliation with or were already insurgents themselves. Revenge was one of the
prevalent motives for Chechen women to become suicide bombers than for Colombian
guerrilleras. Furthermore, additional research is needed to establish if Colombian female
combatants ever experienced isolation or were psychologically traumatized by these crimes.
Sexual violence has shown up as one of the major occurrences for both Chechen and Colombian
females that sought some form of justice through their insurgencies. Another similarity shared
between Chechen and Colombian insurgencies is that they both forced some women to be a part
of their operations. This challenges the notion that insurgencies were viewed as a safe place
where females could receive protection. It also puts both Chechen and Colombian insurgencies
in paradoxical positions as having the same perpetrator role as state actors.
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III.

Conclusion

The civil conflicts that arose within Chechnya and Colombia demonstrate the failure of two
state actors that ignored the needs of the citizens they governed. Both Chechens and Colombians
succumbed to a turbulent environment of political violence, leading to many casualties. The only
way to fight back against armed groups supported by state actors was through the rise of
insurgent groups. Chechens sought independence from Russia and Colombians sought an
alternative measure of governance away from the corrupt Colombian government. Both of these
insurgencies elucidate why non-state actors can gain popularity and power amongst any
oppressed population. The Black Widows and FARC guerrilleras were victimized by the civil
conflicts and therefore sought to join insurgencies as a way to gain some form of redemption or
empowerment. Chechen and Colombian insurgents were willing to engage in lethal violent acts
for the sake of defending their insurgent cause. This shows that despite the terrorist label that
these insurgencies were given, they still could be perceived as a beneficial haven for women.
The motives that still caused female civilians to become suicide bombers in Chechnya
and rebel combatants in Colombia reveal the consequences of main state actors treating female
civilians as insignificant. Ironically, despite the fact that the efforts of these women produced a
good outcome for the insurgent groups they joined, non-state actors continued to treat them as
insignificant within their ranks. My argument is supported by the Chechen Black Widows in that
the Chechen insurgency only saw them as successful in carrying out suicide missions, but never
acknowledged the fight for their rights as women. However, the FARC challenges my argument
as it highly prioritized gender equality within its agenda. Yet there is evidence that FARC also
disregards the plight of women as it sometimes uses coercive measures that violate a woman’s
freedom. Despite existing in different parts of the world, the Colombian and Chechen
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insurgencies display why and how non-state actors can become powerful. Their similarities also
explain why both state-led and non-state armed groups fail to set a better stance in their treatment
of women within Chechen and Colombian cultures.
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